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Of the various strands of democracy promotion, in
this chapter I focus on civil society strengthening
programmes and ask the following questions. First, can
democracy be promoted through civil society
strengthening, and second, given that democracy
appears to have near universal appeal and acceptance
(at least at the level of rhetoric), why has there been a
backlash against democracy promotion that targets civil
society? My reasons for focusing on civil society
strengthening programmes instead of programmes
that are aimed at election monitoring or state institution
building are twofold. First, civil society strengthening
was viewed as an end itself as well as a means of
furthering the other components (such as human rights
and free and fair elections) within the democracy
promotion agenda. Second, the current backlash
against democracy promotion is almost entirely
directed at civil society strengthening programmes and
involves legal and extralegal measures aimed at
constraining, co-opting, coercing or closing foreign-
funded NGOs (Gershman and Allen 2006: 38; Howell et
al. 2007). Foreign funding of NGOs is increasingly being
described as a form of interventionism and neo-
imperialism, and as the creation of a fifth column.
I begin by examining why democracy promotion and
civil society strengthening became a central part of
donor aid programmes in the 1990s, before
discussing the achievements and challenges of
democracy promotion. In doing so, I consider several
explanations and arguments suggested by policy
makers and scholars as to why democracy promotion
has not been as successful as anticipated and hoped
for in the post-Cold War euphoria. I consider a range
of arguments and although I recognise that
authoritarian legacies and culture shape perceptions,
understandings and practices, I argue that the
manner in which civil society and democracy were
defined and operationalised as well as the current
conflation of democracy with regime change in certain
contexts, such as Iraq and Venezuela, have
significantly affected democracy promotion efforts.
Why democracy promotion and civil society
strengthening?
Academic debates
Although he did not use the term civil society, Alexis
de Tocqueville was the first to attribute the
importance of associationalism and self-organisation
for democracy (Kaldor 2003: 19). In the late twentieth
century, de Tocqueville’s work became quite popular
among some American scholars, including Robert
Putnam, Francis Fukuyama and Larry Diamond, and it
was subsequently also influential in policy circles. The
neo-Toquevillian position is that democracy is
strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous
civil society (Putnam 1994) and that successful
transitions to democracy are possible only if civil
society or ‘something like it’ either predates the
transition or is established in the course of a
transition from authoritarian rule (Perez-Diaz 1993:
40). The belief that civil society is a bulwark against
the ‘monstrous state’ (Weffort 1989: 349) and a
counterweight to state power (Rueschemeyer et al.
1992: 6) supported the emphasis on civil society
promotion in US foreign aid programmes, and what
some describe as the ‘democracy aid industry’
(Encarnacion 2003: 709). While these neo-
Tocquevillian theories linking civil society to
democracy became a key element of the post-Cold






























In his testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on the role of non-governmental
organisations in the development of democracy
Ambassador Mark Palmer argued that ‘achieving a 100%
democratic world is possible over the next quarter century
– but only with radical strengthening of our primary
frontline fighters of freedom’ (emphasis added). Palmer
characterises these ‘frontline fighters of freedom’ (i.e. non-
governmental organisations – NGOs) not only as having
assisted ‘a massive expansion in freedom’ but as being the
‘heirs of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Lech
Walesa’ (Palmer 2006). While few scholars of civil society
would describe NGOs in such laudatory language, such
thinkinghas fuelleddemocracypromotioneffortssince the
late 1980s. At that time, the idea that civil society is critical
to development, democratisation and successful
transition became quite prominent among donors and
policy makers, because of their growing enthusiasm for
the idea of civil society, a certain disillusionment with the
over-concentration on aid to state institutions, and the
belief that through civil society ‘democratic forms’ could be
transformed into ‘democratic substance’ (Carothers 2000).
Civil society strengthening subsequently became a
central part of democracy promotion programmes
implemented in both transition and developing
countries. Since 1989 very large sums of money have
been spent by international development agencies,
private foundations and other actors on strengthening,
building, nurturing and supporting the institutions of
civil society, training civil society activists and funding
their projects as a means of promoting democracy. In
the former socialist countries, the aims of ‘democracy
promotion’ and ‘programmes strengthening civil
society’ have been to assist the transition from
socialism as well as to support good governance and
free and fair elections, human rights and the rule of
law. In developing countries, in addition to these aims,
it was hoped that promoting democracy and civil
society strengthening would also enhance aid
effectiveness and support efforts to reduce poverty. In
conflict or post-conflict areas, promoting democracy is
seen as a tool for preventing or reducing conflict
(Kaldor et al. 2007: 110). In addition to all these aims,
after September 11, democracy also came to be seen
as vital in countering terrorism.
Since the early 1990s, programmes strengthening
civil society, in particular American, have excluded
political associations and parties (i.e. political society)
in an attempt to appear non-partisan and to avoid
accusations of ‘playing politics’ (Ottaway and
Carothers 2000: 12). Instead, although donors have
recently sought to expand the definition of civil society
to include more actors than just NGOs, in practice civil
society was often equated with the development and
growth of NGOs and as a result, the infusion of donor
funding and focus on civil society strengthening
throughout the 1990s led to an unprecedented and
exponential growth in the numbers of NGOs
worldwide. Many have referred to this as the
‘NGOisation’ of civil society.
Nearly two decades have passed since the collapse of
the Berlin Wall there is widespread acknowledgement
that democracy promotion efforts in various regions,
including the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East, have failed to produce democratic
regimes, and that the anticipated vibrant, independent
civil societies do not exist. Even in countries where civil
democracy promotion efforts are considered a success
(for example, Eastern Europe) there is growing cynicism
towards civil society (Hann 2004: 47). Furthermore,
there is a rising backlash against democracy promotion
as the euphoria and optimism that accompanied the
collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War
have been replaced by disillusionment. In spite of the
emerging pessimism and backlash, donors and policy
makers describe democracy as a universal value and
right (Ferrerro-Waldner 2006; McFaul 2004: 148; UN
Democracy Fund [UNDEF] url). Such is the popularity of
democracy today that even ‘despots’ (Rieffer and Mercer
2005: 385) and ‘tyrants’ (McFaul 2004: 151) who are
suspicious of Western-led democracy promotion,
pretend to be democrats or claim they are charting an
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among certain donor agencies, they are not
universally accepted among academics.
On the contrary, there are scholars who argue that
democracy can be weakened by civil society (Berman
1997; Bermeo and Nord 2000) and that the nature of
civil society is far more important than the existence
of civil society alone (Bayart 1986; White 2004). Sheri
Berman, in particular, has pointed out the dangers of
an active civil society, which can lead to illiberal
regimes. Through an analysis of the collapse of the
Weimar Republic, Berman argues that the active
participation of citizens in civil society led to the
weakening of democracy and the rise of the Nazi party
(Berman 1997: 408). She maintains that middle-class
tension and frustration sparked the growth and
activism in voluntary associations and that their
participation subverted republican virtue (Berman
1997: 417). She contends that what is needed is a shift
away from the normative view of civil society to a more
politically neutral view, in which civil society or
associationalism are neither ‘inherently good nor
inherently bad, but rather dependent’ on the wider
political context (1997: 426–27).
David Rieff also criticises the ‘dogma holding that
civil society strengthening is the key to creating and
sustaining a healthy polity’ (Rieff 1999). He views the
rise in popularity of civil society in the late 1980s and
1990s as being part of wider trend of the privatisation
of the state and the shrinking of overseas aid budgets,
and argues for a greater focus on the nation state than
on civil society.
While the neo-Tocquevillian position was influential
in donor policy circles, it should be recalled that the
Latin American and Eastern European intellectuals,
dissidents and activists were far more inspired and
influenced by the ideas of Italian Marxist Antonio
Gramsci. For Gramsci, civil society was more than
political economy. He questioned the economism of
the Marxist definition and went on to invert Marx’s
vision by arguing that ideologies come before
institutions and that ideology is the force capable of
shaping new histories (Bobbio 1988: 88). Gramsci
placed the emphasis on civil society’s politically
relevant cultural dimension (Cohen 1999: 214) and
considered civil society as the space for the
(re)production and contestation of hegemonic as well
as counter-hegemonic discourses. In both Eastern
Europe and Latin America civil society referred to
autonomy and self-organisation, with an emphasis on
withdrawal from the state and the creation instead of
‘islands of civic engagement’ (Kaldor 2003: 193).
In the 1980s Jürgen Habermas’ work on civil society
also became quite influential in academic circles.
Habermas’ notion of the communicative public sphere
envisaged a space where people could discuss
matters of mutual concern and learn about facts,
events and others’ opinions (Habermas 1996). As
opposed to de Toqueville’s vision in which public
opinion was treated more as ‘a compulsion toward
conformity’, for Habermas public communication had
the potential to provide the space in which the general
or public interest could be rationally and critically
discussed (Habermas 1992: 133). Although Habermas
saw this potential in the ideal model of the public
sphere, he also expressed concern with the
colonisation of the ‘lifeworld’ that undermined the
progressive potential of the project (Howell and
Pearce 2002: 57). Nevertheless, Habermas went on to
search for the emancipatory possibilities of civil
society and subsequently triggered a debate, which
continues today, about civil society, democracy and
conceptions of the public sphere.
While scholars continue to debate the virtues,
relationship and contributions of civil society to
democracy, in the 1990s donors began actively
supporting civil society strengthening programmes,
driven by the belief that the relationship between civil
society and democracy is natural and inevitable
(Howell and Pearce 2002: 51). Driven by policy





























The public sphere: a space to discuss, learn and exchange
believed that through financial and technical
assistance to civil society, democracy could be built.
When conducting interviews with donors in Armenia in
2002–3, I was struck by the fact that none of my
respondents from donor agencies who were engaged
in democracy promotion programmes ever questioned
whether civil society should be strengthened as part of
their democracy building efforts; the question was
always how it could best be done. Indeed, as the
transitions progressed in all the former socialist
countries, the radical democratic ideas and visions of
civil society that had emerged in the 1980s dissipated,
giving way to more established and less revolutionary
neo-liberal ones. Subsequently, civil society became a
project that was implemented in the name of
democracy building, which eventually led to the
projectisation of civil society (Sampson 2002). While
this approach has led to the phenomenal growth in the
number of NGOs, it has not generated genuine
participation or public debate. The following quote,
cited by Timothy Garton Ash from an Eastern
European colleague, sums up the projectisation which
occurred in the 1990s: ‘We dreamed of civil society and
got NGOs’ (Garton Ash 2004).
It is important to note that although most bilateral
and multilateral donors have some institutional
mechanism for engaging with or supporting civil
society strengthening, not all explicitly focus on
democracy building or democracy promotion
programmes. In the next section I consider the
different stances of the key bilateral and multilateral,
as well as non-state, donors that have been involved in
civil society strengthening for democracy promotion.
Donor approaches to democracy promotion
US democracy promotion
Although the US has been engaged in democracy
promotion since the 1980s through a focus on election
monitoring, civil society strengthening became a
significant part of US foreign policy following the
collapse of the socialist regimes (Ottaway and
Carothers 2000). Since then, civil society assistance has
come to be considered ‘a centrepiece of America’s
international outreach’ (US Senate 2006: 1) and ‘a
matter of principle’ (Tobias 2007). This position is
reflected in the fact that since the early 1990s, more
money has been spent on civil society assistance than
on any other sectors of USAID democracy assistance1
(Finkel et al. 2006: 33). From 1990–2003, most USAID
democracy assistance was sent to the countries in
Eurasia ($5.77 million) with the lowest levels of aid going
to Africa ($1.29 million) and Asia ($1.29 million) (Finkel
et. al. 2006: 33–4). US-funded civil society assistance
has largely been directed at NGOs, because the USAID
position in the early 1990s was to provide vigorous
support for local NGOs, which would ‘be a critical
element of civil society strengthening’ (USAID 1999: v).
Although the earlier strong focus on NGOs has shifted
somewhat and civil society is now defined more broadly,
the assumption persists that ‘a strong civil society is
desirable and makes democratic practices and
traditions more likely to flourish’ (USAID 1999: xi). As US
Senator Joseph Biden stated in the 2006 Senate Foreign
Relations committee hearing on NGOs, ‘we must
understand that an election does not a democracy
make…A democracy must rest on the foundation of a
strong civil society’ (Biden 2006, emphasis added).
Funding in this area increased following September
11 when democracy promotion became a distinct
national security concern and ‘key objective of US
foreign policy’ (USAID url).While the official US
position is clear vis à vis civil society and democracy
promotion, the approach of the European Union and
various leading European bilateral donors toward
democracy promotion in general and civil society
strengthening in particular is more ‘vague’ (Schmid
and Braizat 2006: 3) and ‘opaque’ (Youngs 2006: 8).
European democracy promotion
While democratisation is by no means a new departure
for the EU or European bilateral donors, Richard
Gillespie and Richard Youngs contend that the US began
focusing more systematically on democratisation
slightly earlier than the EU and that effective co-
ordination of EU democracy promotion efforts has been
conspicuously absent (Gillespie and Youngs 2002). They
maintain that until the late 1990s, the lack of
mechanisms for marrying national initiatives to overall
common guidelines on democracy presented a serious
challenge to effective concerted European action
(Gillespie and Youngs 2000: 6). Discussions on
transatlantic democracy building efforts have
1 For instance, while civil society aid was $2,438.2 million from
1990–2003, governance and rule of law programmes received
$1,457.6 million and $1,218.5 million respectively (Finkel et.al.
2006: 33).































intensified following September 11 (Schmid and Braizat
2006: 4), but as Jeffrey Kopstein points out, following the
war in Iraq, many European leaders and the European
public remain suspicious of democracy promotion,
interpreting it as ‘a repackaged commitment to the
unilateral use of force as well as justification for war and
occupation’ (Kopstein 2006: 85).
Presently, the EU is intensifying its democracy
promotion programmes. Of the three strands of EU
democracy promotion that include enlargement, the
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), and the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP), the EIDHR is the EU structure that most
specifically targets civil society. Created in 1994 and with
a current annual budget of €100–130 million, the EIDHR
supports human rights, democratisation and conflict
prevention activities. EIDHR is seen as more flexible
than other EU institutions and policies concerned with
enlargement in that it can act entirely independently of
national governments in partner countries and work
with a wider ranger of actors, including parliaments,
political foundations and civil society organisations, but
it has been criticised for failing to have a real impact
because its lacks administrative flexibility, requires long
lead times and tends to favour the capital-based NGOs,
known as the ‘capital darlings’ (European Foundation
for Democracy 2006: 6).
A survey of European bilateral and multilateral
democracy promotion policies from 2001–6 by the
Fundacion Para Las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE) also found that there was
sufficient complexity and diversity to make it difficult
to speak of ‘the European approach’ (Youngs 2006: 25,
emphasis in original). Of the seven countries surveyed
(Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and the UK), there was variation in the levels
of ‘democracy-related competence’ and ‘manpower
allocated specifically to democracy promotion
responsibilities remained limited’, with Sweden
having the most clearly articulated democracy
promotion policies (Youngs 2006: 16–17). While
various European bilateral donors, including the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and
the Swedish International Development Co-operation
Agency (SIDA), actively support and engage with civil
society actors through their programmes, they tend to
view democracy as a means by which to eliminate or
overcome poverty (DFID urla; urlb) or as a means for
achieving peace, justice and human rights (SIDA
1997). Democracy is not discussed as a matter of
principle or centrepiece of policy, as in the US context
discussed above.
Moreover, there is relatively less focus on civil
society as a key pillar of democracy promotion among
European bilateral and multilateral donors as
compared to the US. Indeed organisations such as the
US National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (url),





























described as ‘pushy’ by some respondents in the
FRIDE report (Youngs 2006: 18). Even the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is far more
focused on legislative processes, legal training, rule of
law and political parties than on civil society.
The UN approach
Even though democracy is not a precondition for UN
membership and the word ‘democracy’ does not
appear in the UN charter, since 2005 the UN has also
made a foray into democracy promotion. According to
Newman and Rich,
It is not one of the stated purposes of the United
Nations to foster democracy, to initiate the process of
democratisation or to legitimise other actors’ efforts
in this field [democracy promotion]. (Newman and
Rich 2004: 5)
Although various UN agencies, including the UN
Development Programme and the Office for the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, have engaged with
civil society through their programme activities or civil
society consultative fora, including the Conference of
Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative
Relationship with the UN (CONGO),2 the
establishment of the UNDEF3 in July 2005 was the first
time that a separate structure was created in the UN
specifically to promote democracy. Of UNDEF’s six
funding priority areas, three focus on civil society and
provide funding for civil society empowerment, civic
education and citizens’ access to information.
Although this demonstrates a focus on civil society in
democratisation, there are concerns as to how
UNDEF will decide on funding to NGOs and other civil
society organisations that are critical of a member
state’s authority. According to the executive head of
UNDEF, Magdy Martinez Soliman, active democracy
promotion is only a recent admissible part of the UN
mandate and one that has been problematic because
it can eventually go against the will of the non-
democratic representative of a member state
(Martinez-Soliman 2006: 2). There is concern with
maintaining a balance between respecting national
ownership on political transitions while providing
external support to democrats and democratic
values, so that democracy assistance is not seen as
regime change or interference. For this reason,
Martinez-Soliman argues that democracy assistance
from the UN should be provided only at a member
state’s request, otherwise democracy promotion in
hostile environments can create ‘the kiss of death’ –
bolstering the authoritarians’ argument that
democrats are not representative of the national
community and are supported from abroad.
Non-state actors and democracy promotion
In addition to bilateral and multilateral agencies,
non-state actors, including private foundations,
Northern NGOs, private service contractors, political
parties and others have been involved in democracy
promotion. There are differences among these
various actors in terms of their objectives and
missions, as well as levels of financial independence
and autonomy. Some organisations, such as the Open
Society Institute (also known as the Soros
Foundation) and the Ford Foundation, are funded by
private endowments and consider democracy
promotion as an integral part of their mission. They
have been actively engaged in democracy promotion
and civil society strengthening. Meanwhile NGOs or
quasi-NGOs such as the US-based NED and National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, or the
UK-based Westminster Foundation for Democracy
(url), which are also committed to promoting
democracy around the world, have less financial
independence than the aforementioned private
foundations and are dependent on government
funding.4 For instance, NED receives an annual
appropriation from the US Congress through the
Department of State (NED url), while the
Westminster Foundation is an independent body that
receives £4.1 million annual funding from the UK
Police survey a public protest in Uzbekistan
2 The Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in
Consultative Relationship with the UN (CONGO) is an
independent, international, not-for-profit membership
association of NGOs that facilitates the participation of NGOs
in UN debates and decisions.
3 The UNDEF is a voluntary UN Trust Fund under the overall
management of the UN Secretary General with an Advisory
Board of 17 members, including representatives from the
largest member state contributors.
4 It should be noted that these NGOs are also engaged in raising
funds from individual donors as well as corporations.
5 The report did not indicate how the $8 billion was broken down
among programme areas.
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undeniable, increased activism should not necessarily
be seen as the result of democracy promotion
programmes for two reasons. First, much of the civil
society activism at the global level comes from
organisations based in or operating in the global
North; far fewer Southern organisations are engaged
in lobbying and advocacy at the global level. It still
tends to be the ‘usual suspects’ (that is, well-
established, Northern-based organisations) that are
engaged in global activism and included in
consultations with intergovernmental organisations.
For instance, only 251 of the 1,550 NGOs associated
with the UN Department of Public Information come
from the global South; the remainder are NGOs from
the global North (Wild 2006).
Second, although the numbers of NGOs have
dramatically increased in developing and transition
countries, the reality is that the vast majority of these
NGOs are almost entirely dependent on foreign
support. This dependence not only raises concerns
about their long-term sustainability and impact but
also raises questions about their legitimacy, probity
and accountability. In other words, are these NGOs
considered legitimate actors locally? These
considerations are often ignored and the growth in the
number of NGOs is frequently cited by donors as a
sign of success. This is due to the fact that it is easier
to count the number of organisations and to cite
increased numbers as evidence of the impact and
success of donor programmes. For instance, the
‘Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story’ report
published by USAID in 1999 examines the lessons
learned in ‘building civil society in Central and Eastern
Europe and the New Independent States’. The report
acknowledges that the immense amount of aid led to
an ‘explosive growth of local NGOs’ (USAID 1999: 3),
citing growth as one of the eight success indicators.6
The need for demonstrating success is driven by the
pressures on all actors engaged in democracy
promotion, whether donors or recipients, to
demonstrate effectiveness and to give account to their
own funders. However, since it is difficult to measure
the impact of democracy-building efforts on people’s
behaviour and attitudes, often what is considered and
presented as signs of success are the formal or
procedural democratic mechanisms and institutions.
The minimalist or procedural definition of
democracy is identified as originating with Joseph
Schumpeter (1947), who argued that democracy at the
conceptual level is the existence of citizens holding
their rulers accountable and the existence of
procedures by which to do so. This narrow approach
focuses on the formal institutions of democracy and
does not consider social and economic inequalities
and how they affect participation, access and decision
making. While procedural democratic institutions and
mechanisms are necessary and in fact represent an a
priori safeguard against the abuses of power and for
the development of substantive democracy (Kaldor
and Vejvoda 1997: 63), there are many managed7
democracies where the procedural elements are
present but where substantive democracy is absent.
Consequently while recognising the successes, we
must be cautious in prematurely proclaiming the
triumph of democracy promotion efforts, consider the
challenges and ask why a backlash against civil
society strengthening is emerging.
Challenges and obstacles to democracy
promotion
Cultural barriers
In analysing why the transitions to democracy have































Foreign and Commonwealth Office (url). In addition to
these various types of foundations, there are also
political parties or organisations affiliated to political
parties that engage in democracy promotion. In
Germany, for instance, there are a number of
organisations, including the Friedrich Ebert,
Friedrich Naumann, Heinrich Böll and Konrad
Adenauer foundations that are associated with
various political parties and that have been active in
democracy promotion. Finally, among non-state
actors, there are the private service contractors or
consulting companies (such as Planning and
Development Collabrative International and
Development Alternatives, Inc. url), which procure
contracts and carry out democracy promotion, civil
society strengthening and governance on behalf of
and based on the specifications of their clients.
USAID, in particular, provides a significant amount of
contracts to such consulting companies and private
service contractors. In 2004 alone it provided US $8
billion to contractors engaged in carrying out
international development projects throughout the
world5 (USAID 2006).
While the levels of financial and operational
autonomy vary, it is important to recognise that similar
to the bilateral and multilateral approaches discussed
above, there tends to be a strong commitment among
all the aforementioned non-state actors to the belief
that civil society is important for democracy building.
So, given the involvement of such diverse actors, what
has been the impact of democracy promotion through
civil society strengthening? Democracy promotion has
had mixed results.
Achievements of democracy promotion
programmes
Many of the democracy promotion success stories are
about the countries in Central and East Europe,
although South Africa and the Philippines are also
mentioned (Gaventa 2006; Hawthorne 2004: 5). The
EU enlargement and accession process has come to
be seen not only as the EU’s first major experience of
democracy promotion, but also as one of the most
successful cases of democracy promotion in general.
Integration into the EU is often described as an
effective tool of democracy promotion because it
provided incentives for the leadership of
democratising countries to pursue internal changes
(McFaul 2004: 157). Certainly, great strides have been
made and many democratic institutions and practices
have been established in the countries of Central and
East Europe. However, this did not happen overnight
and enlargement is not an approach that can be
replicated elsewhere. Moreover, the ‘return to Europe’
has been more complicated than would initially
appear. Examining democratisation processes in
Central and Eastern Europe, Mary Kaldor and Ivan
Vejvoda recognise the establishment of formal
democratic institutions and maintain that there is
hope for the development of substantive democracies
in these countries. They contend that the process of
democratisation, in substantive terms, is ‘underway’
(Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997: 80). While acknowledging
the successes of Eastern European countries in
establishing democratic institutions and practices, it
is important to also recognise that the development of
democracy and the growth of Eastern European civil
societies (namely, an increased number of
organisations) has not necessarily been translated
into greater citizen engagement or participation
(Celichowski 2004: 77), or led to greater benefits for
various social groups (Hann 2004: 46).
The exponential growth in numbers of NGOs
worldwide is also often cited as evidence of the
success of democracy promotion efforts. Indeed,
there has been a ‘global associational revolution’
(Salamon and Anheier 1997) and the number of civil
society organisations has dramatically grown
worldwide since 1990. Civil society organisations, and
in particular NGOs, are actively engaged with
governments and intergovernmental bodies on issues
of global and national importance through awareness
raising, advocacy and lobbying. These organisations
work on a wide spectrum of issues, including poverty
reduction, debt relief, human rights, women’s rights,
the environment and others. Although there are
questions about civil society impact on policy making,
the ability of civil society actors to introduce issues
onto national and global political agendas, to
influence public debates, and to name and shame
actors who do not deliver on their promises, should
not be underestimated. Consultations with NGOs, as
well as the growing complaints about the power of
NGOs from politicians and business leaders, attest to
the fact that civil society organisations are actively
engaged in public debates and policy advocacy at the
national and global levels.





























Women and men queue in separate lines to vote to Afghanistan
6 Other indicators include the increased managerial
competence of local NGOs, the establishment of regional
linkages, strengthened sectoral infrastructures, improved
prospects for NGO financial sustainability, improved legal and
regulatory frameworks governing NGO sector operations,
learning by local NGOs of professional grant making systems
and procedures and, finally, the benefit to women and minority
groups as well as reflecting social concerns and public policy
issues important to women and minorities through the
establishment of NGOs (USAID 1999: 5–6; see box 4.1).
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When I visited Armenia in 2005 I found that donor interest had shifted to other topics and that all but one of
the shelter programmes had closed due to lack of funding. One of the six NGOs involved even denied any
involvement in the 2002–04 campaign (Ishkanian, forthcoming). There was broad consensus among the other
NGOs involved that, even though the anti-domestic violence campaign had not fully overcome the resistance
and criticisms encountered from the outset, at least it had accomplished the difficult task of introducing the
topic to the public and generating discussion about the issue. Less successful were the technical solutions,
such as shelters and hotlines, employed by NGOs to try to combat the problem.
Hotlines were not successful in Armenia for a number of reason, including the costs of phone calls (there
were no toll-free numbers during the campaign); the absence or poor provision of telephone services in
some rural areas; the lack of privacy in most households; and the fact that sharing problems with a stranger
over the phone is a alien concept. Meanwhile, shelters, which may be successful in developed countries with
welfare systems that provide public assistance, unemployment benefits, health insurance, subsidised housing
and free schooling, did not work in Armenia, where these provisions are either not present or not functioning.
All that a shelter can do in Armenia is to provide counselling and housing for up to four weeks, leaving the
question of what happens to a woman when she leaves a shelter unanswered. Without viable employment,
affordable housing and subsistence benefits, often the only options for women are to return to their husband
or their parental household. The lack of alternatives and public assistance meant that shelter programmes
were viewed by many women as untenable.
The technical solutions such as hotlines and shelters that were implemented ignored the socioeconomic
problems, including poverty, unemployment and multi-generational households living in cramped conditions,
which exacerbate and at times provoke incidences of domestic violence, as well as the fact that Armenia has a
weak social welfare system. They were thus implemented in the place of more ambitious programmes that
would address the structural and economic inequalities and provide more long-term and sustainable
solutions. Unless the broader issue of access to services and a more robust welfare system are addressed,
short-term, temporary, technical solutions such as shelters will not solve the suffering of the victims of
domestic violence.
Armine Ishkanian, Lecturer in Social Policy, LSE
Box 4.1: En-gendering democracy: the 2002-04 anti-domestic violence campaign and
democracy building in Armenia
Following the collapse of communism, support for women’s organisations in the post-socialist states in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union became a significant component of democracy promotion and
civil society strengthening programmes. Donors, including USAID, the Ford Foundation, the German Marshall
Fund, the Eurasia Foundation and the Open Society Institute, shared the belief that there was a direct link
between democratisation and women’s advocacy groups (Ghodsee 2004; Hemment 2004; Henderson 2003;
McMahon 2002; Richter 2002). Furthermore, the pressure to liberalise the economy and to privatise state
welfare delivery often meant that women, traditionally involved in caring for children, the disabled and the
elderly, assumed a greater share of this burden in the face of shrinking public services. By the end of the
1990s, women’s NGOs represented a significant proportion of NGO activism in the former Soviet countries
(Berg 2004; Hemment 2004; Henderson 2003; Ishkanian 2004; Olson 2003; Richter 2002; Tohidi 2004), and at
the same time domestic violence became a popular funding initiative among donors. In September 2002 the
USAID Mission in Armenia made available US $476,367, which was divided among six Armenian NGOs. This
funding was part of the USAID Democracy Program (USAID 2002: 32–34) and the six grants represented the
first direct USAID grants to Armenian NGOs (USAID 2002).
Although the issue was being discussed in global forums and funding was becoming more readily available
in the mid-1990s (Sen 2003), domestic violence was still a taboo subject in many post-Soviet countries,
including Armenia. Unlike in the USA or Europe, where the issue of domestic violence was first raised and
addressed by local women’s organisations and groups of battered women (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 174), in
Armenia there was no broad-based grassroots movement pushing for recognition of the problem. Most of the
women’s or human rights NGOs that worked on the issue did not begin doing so until the announcement of
large grant programmes (Ishkanian 2004).
Domestic violence had not been recognised locally as a social issue that could be addressed by law
enforcement, hotlines and shelters until it was identified as such by Western donors and experts; and therefore
the problem, as well as the proposed solutions (i.e. hotlines, shelters), were perceived as being artificially
imported and imposed. This perception led to widespread civil society criticism of and resistance to the efforts
of the six NGOs involved in the 2002–04 USAID-funded campaign. Although much of the criticism was directed
at specific policy solutions, such as shelters, the metanarrative of the critique was directed at the influence of
donors and the post-Soviet transition policies (i.e. liberalisation and privatisation) more generally.
As the campaign unfolded, the greatest challenge for these NGOs became countering the persistent civil
society resistance to and critique of the campaign, which alleged that the issue was being imposed by donors
and that the six NGOs’ involvement was motivated by greed and grant-seeking. This led the six NGOs to
devote a significant amount of time demonstrating the existence of domestic violence existed in Armenia,
arguing that they were not working on the issue because of the grant money, and explaining that they
considered local cultural practices and beliefs while designing their programmes. In addition, they sought to
legitimise their work by framing domestic violence as a human rights issue and maintaining that addressing
the problem was a critical component for democracy building. The crux of their argument was to define
domestic violence as a human rights violation and to contend that since the protection of human rights are a
necessary, if not obligatory, component of democracy building, the anti-domestic violence campaign was
contributing to democratisation processes in Armenia. During interviews, in public addresses, and in their




























































































that a society’s propensity or ‘fitness’ for democracy is
predicated on its cultural and geographic proximity to
the West (Nodia 2002; McFaul 2002). Ernest Gellner
(1994), for instance, argued that the concept of civil
society is inapplicable in certain contexts, including in
non-Western patrimonial societies and in tribal
societies (Gellner 1994). He questioned whether civil
society could exist in Islamic societies. Others, such
as Elie Kedourie or Serif Mardin, have also claimed
civil society is a Western dream that does not
translate well into Islamic terms (Mardin 1995, quoted
in Sajoo 2002) or that Muslims have nothing in their
own political traditions that is compatible with
Western notions of democracy (Kedourie 1992).
Meanwhile, in the context of the post-socialist
countries in Eastern Europe, ‘transitologists’ often
‘invoke “culture”, that amorphous, omnibus concept’
as an explanation for why certain Western policies or
blueprints have been resisted (Burawoy and Verdery
1999: 14). For instance, in Bosnia, culture or ethnic
mentality were cited as reasons for the inability to
embrace civil society development and
democratisation. David Chandler discusses the
disparaging ways in which the Bosnian people and
society were viewed by some international actors and
internationally funded local NGOs. They perceived
Bosnian society as ‘deeply sick’, ‘feudalistic’ or as ‘the
flock’ (Chandler 2004: 240–1). He argues that this
focus on the perceived incapacities of Bosnians is only
one side of the story and that greater attention must
be paid to the ‘failing within international
democratisation practice itself’ (Chandler 2004: 228).
Such sweeping generalisations and claims that
blame culture for the lack of democracy or progress
are hardly new; they are examples of the
interpretations that have been used to explain the
failure of development and modernisation
programmes since the 1950s. Michael Herzfeld
criticises the ‘misuse of the culture concept’ in the
media and among some academics who decry
‘Balkan nationalism’ and ‘religious fundamentalism’,
all the while failing to recognise their own, Western
cultural fundamentalisms. Yet, as Herzfeld adds,
rejecting the essentialisation of other cultures does
not legitimate meting out the same treatment to the
‘West’, and for treating the West as a generic bogey
(Herzfeld 2001: 152). Such views, Herzfeld maintains,
not only essentialise the ‘other’ but they also
essentialise ‘the West’. For this reason it is important
to recognise that the culture concept is also (mis)used
by authoritarian leaders who argue that democracy or
human rights are incompatible with local traditions
and values.
From African dictators in the 1970s to Asian
government officials in the 1990s there have been two
sets of arguments: first, democracy is a luxury that
can and should only come after a certain stage of
economic development and stability has been
achieved; and second, democracy is a Western
individualistic value that is not compatible with more
‘traditional’ or kin-based societies. These arguments
held great sway in the 1990s until the financial crisis
in Asia undermined the ‘Asian values’ position and
silenced most of its supporters (Thompson 2001: 154).
While I would argue that cultural beliefs and
ideologies are certainly important and do affect
individuals’ understandings and behaviour, I am
sceptical of the essentialising discourses that view
culture as an unproblematic, monolithic and static
entity. Furthermore, I find quite problematic the
tendency in some of the works on culture as a
mitigating factor to democratisation to speak of the
‘other’ as being affected by culture, whilst claiming to
be objective and thereby ignoring how one’s own
behaviour and understandings are also influenced by
cultural beliefs. I argue that if the cultural argument
is to be applied, it is necessary to examine critically
the cultural attitudes and biases of both donors and
recipients.
Authoritarian legacies
In addition to arguing that culture is a barrier to
democracy promotion, some policy makers and
scholars have maintained that the authoritarian
legacies in various countries mitigate the
development of a vibrant civil society and democracy
(Brzezinski 2002: 196; Gershman and Allen 2006;
McFaul 2002: 264; Nodia 2002: 203). In an article co-
written with Michael Allen, the President of NED, Carl





























7 ‘Managed democracy’ (upravlyayemaya demokratiya) is a
phrase that was introduced by the Russian authorities in the
early 2000s and is now being increasingly used to describe the
situation in other former Soviet states (such as Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan). It refers to a situation in which the
formal/procedural institutions and practices (for example,
elections) of democracies exist but are controlled and
managed by the authorities (Colton and McFaul 2003).
against democracy promotion are a ‘by-product of so-
called hybrid regimes’ (Gershman and Allen 2006: 37).
Hybrid regimes, according to Gershman and Allen,
are those that have certain formally democratic
procedures, including the holding of relatively free (if
not fair) elections and allowing civil society
organisations to function. In other words, hybrid
regimes are procedural democracies where the
substantive elements are either weakly constituted or
missing. Clearly, societies do not exist in a vacuum
and it very important to examine and understand how
the past has influenced and continues to influence the
present. In discussing the lack of civic participation or
democracy in Arab countries, there is again a
tendency to argue that decades of authoritarian rule
have left a legacy of ‘widespread political apathy’
(Hawthorne 2004: 10). Meanwhile, in the post-Soviet
states certain practices (such as corruption and clan-
based rule), which were common under Communist
rule, persist and have influenced how the current
policies have been interpreted, adapted, and
operationalised.
While recognising the importance of history, I would
argue it is important not to attribute all of the present
problems to the legacies and memories of the past. In
the field of democracy promotion in particular, Cold
War ideologies have influenced and shaped the design
and implementation of policies and practices. In the
1990s these ideologies had engendered the notion
that everything created prior to the collapse of
communism was either ‘not true civil society’ or that
it was polluted and contaminated by the Communist
legacy and had to be purged before true civil society
and democracy could flourish (Mandel 2002). The
reality is far more complex and it is worth considering
how the past is interpreted and instrumentalised by
different parties under different circumstances.
For instance, in recent years there has been
growing selective remembrance (that is, forgetting
about the political repressions and lack of freedoms)
and intensifying nostalgia for the ‘stability’ of the
Soviet past and a questioning of the benefits of
democracy, which is linked in the minds of many post-
Soviet citizens with the introduction of the shock
therapies that led to poverty, gross inequality, social
exclusion, gangster capitalism and the rise of the
oligarchs (see box 4.2). Democracy promotion in
Eastern Europe was also affected by the close
association between democracy and market reform
programmes. Because the rapidly implemented
market reforms and shock therapies of the early
1990s led to vast inequality, poverty and social
exclusion, people soon became disillusioned, not only
with the market reforms but also with the associated
programme of democracy building.8
'Pure Victory' reads the fruit juice advert above Russianscommemorating the 1917 October Revolution
GCS_Democracy_CH4/5/6/7:GCS Part 2_Issues  12/7/07  22:16  Page 12
In the past two years Nashi has organised numerous high profile demonstrations. In 2006 members of Nashi
spearheaded a campaign against the British Ambassador in Moscow, Anthony Brenton, because he had attended an
opposition conference organised by the ‘Other Russia’ coalition. Brenton’s appearance at this conference sparked a
series of protests led by Nashi including demonstrations in front of the Ambassador’s official residence and
disruptions at public events where Brenton was due to speak. Nashi claimed it wanted Mr Brenton to apologise for
having shown support for what the movement defined as extremist and nationalist groups.
On 17 December 2006, over 70,000 Nashi members dressed as Father Christmas, Snow Maiden or elves took to
the streets of Moscow to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Soviet victory against the Nazis in the Battle of
Moscow. The day before, a rally was held with heavy police reinforcements to commemorate more than 200
journalists killed in Russia in the past 15 years. Only 200 people attended this commemoration.
In April and May 2007, Nashi members began to hold daily protests in front of the Estonian embassy in Moscow
following the removal of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn statue. The removal of this statue is described on the group’s
website as evidence of state sanctioned fascism in Estonia.
In addition to these high profile demonstrations, Nashi provides educational and ideological training to its
members. Those who successfully complete the training and pass the exams become Nashi commissars. The
commissars are the most active members who receive even further education and training, and are groomed for
leadership positions. In the various provinces Nashi activists also organise master classes, lectures, and educational
competitions for high school students.
Nashi and Democracy Promotion
Nashi is growing against the backdrop of criticism in Russia about how the country fared in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and what it perceived as its humiliation and loss of status globally. According to Steven Pifer, a
senior adviser with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington:
Moscow’s combative stance is widely seen as a reaction to the humiliation many Russians felt in the 1990s, when the
country was emerging from the Soviet collapse…Russia was also subject to frequent Western lectures about how best
to rebuild its society and government. There is this lingering perception that in the 1990s the West somehow took
advantage of Russia. (Whitmore 2007)
Indeed there is a growing backlash against democracy promotion and civil society strengthening in the way it was
introduced by Western donors and NGOs in the 1990s (Carothers 2006; Howell et. al. 2007). While derided for his
autocratic policies in the West, Putin currently enjoys widespread public support in Russia. His popularity is based on
the perception that he has restored Russia’s pride and place in the world and that he is challenging the hegemony of
Western powers including the US and Britain. In a scathing critique of democracy promotion, Putin made the following
remarks at the G8 Summit in St Petersburg:
If you look at newspapers of 100 years ago, you see how, at the time, colonialist states justified their policies in Africa or in
Asia. They talked of their civilising role, of the white man's mission. If you change the word 'civilising' to 'democratisation',
you find the same logic, you can read the same things in the press today. (BBC 2006)
According to Russian political analyst, Pyotr Romanov, one of the implicit items on the summit's agenda was the
issue of the independence and sovereignty in relations between democratic countries. He writes, ‘In a unipolar world
dominated by the United States and its desire to be "generous" to humankind by forcing the North American
worldview on it, this issue was bound to surface at bilateral talks within the G8 and during joint discussions’
(Romanov 2006). Such criticisms of Western democracy promotion are becoming more widespread in Russia and
other former Soviet countries (including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc.) and Nashi, which draws on Soviet and post-
Soviet era models of organising, is both a recipient as well as purveyor of these neo-Cold War ideologies.
Armine Ishkanian, Lecturer in Social Policy, LSE
Box 4.2: Nashi (Ours)
What is Nashi?
Nashi (Ours) is a pro-government, patriotic Russian youth movement that was created in March 2005. Since then, it has
rapidly grown throughout Russia and presently has over 200,000 members, of which 10,000 are regular activists or Nashi
‘commissars’ (Konovalova 2007). The majority of Nashi members are in their late teens or twenties and for some
membership is a path to career advancement. The movement’s activities include organising voluntary work for members
in orphanages and helping restore churches and war memorials, organising educational and training programmes, and
organising demonstrations and rallies. Critics, including Russian opposition activists as well as Western observers, argue
that the movement is the Kremlin’s attempt to co-opt the youth, control dissent and to prevent a ‘colour revolution’ from
occurring in Russia. Given that youth groups played an instrumental role in organising mass demonstrations in Serbia in
2000 (Otpor – Resistance), Georgia in 2003 (Kmara – Enough) and Ukraine in 2004 (Pora –High Time), the establishment of
and support for Nashi is seen as a pre-emptive measure, especially in view of the 2008 presidential elections. Although
Nashi has been described as a neo-Komsomol (Communist Youth Movement) movement that, similar to its Soviet
predecessor, trains and grooms its members for leadership positions, it does so by using the forms (demonstrations, sit-
ins), techniques (master classes, trainings), and language (of rights, participation) of civil society organising.
Sovereign democracy and the Nashi manifesto
According to its manifesto, Nashi’s aims are to support Russia’s development as a global leader in the twenty first
century through economic, social and cultural means rather than through military and political domination. The key
theme throughout the manifesto is sovereignty, which is interpreted as the freedom and independence to set the ‘rules
of the game’ in one’s own country and the rejection of Western (i.e. American) hegemony. The manifesto also rails
against and calls for the liquidation of ‘oligarchical capitalism’, crediting President Vladimir Putin as the first to have
challenged the oligarchs’ power, for strengthening the state, and for turning Russia into a global power. Nashi pledges
its support for Putin’s policies and vows to work toward these goals in a variety of ways, including through the creation
of a ‘functioning civil society’ (deiistvuyeshevo grazhdanskovo obshestva). Criticising the existing ‘liberal’ civil society as
being the ‘worst advertisement for democracy’, the manifesto claims that Nashi will promote civil debates, work with
multiple stakeholders (such as government, business, etc) to promote Russia’s economic and social development, fight
against fascism and intolerance towards ethnic minorities, campaign against violence in the army, and restore people’s
faith in Russia’s future (URLa).
Nashi’s manifesto is greatly influenced by the work of Kremlin ideologue, Vladislav Surkov, and his idea of
sovereign democracy (suverennaya demokratsiya), which rejects the notion of a single type of democracy (i.e.
American) and argues that each country should have the freedom and sovereignty to develop its own form. Indeed the
only ‘sources’ cited on the movement’s website are Surkov’s works (URLb). The concept of sovereign democracy is a
critique of Western democracy promotion efforts which were implemented following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The idea of sovereign democracy as espoused is currently spreading beyond Russia. In July 2006 the Nashi
Rossiya-Uzbekistan movement was established in Uzbekistan (Saidazimova 2006). Meanwhile, Dariga Nazarbaeva,
the daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, praised sovereign democracy as sign of freedom.
She said:
For a long time, we trod a path to democracy guided by maps prepared in the West. But times are changing. We see
more and more countries and peoples in the world refusing to live according to identical patterns set up for them by
someone else. Even the failure of the European constitution, was in defence of the national and the home-grown.. In
defence of sovereignty (Kimmage 2006).
Demonstrations, mass mobilisations and education
While opposition groups, including members of the ‘Other Russia’ (Drugaya Rossiya) coalition, have faced
harassment from police and had their rallies and meetings disrupted by security forces, in contrast Nashi’s actions,
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where many of the same policies and training were
also implemented, a Georgian NGO leader writes,
Some [Western] specialists come without the slightest
knowledge of the countries they are advising.
The latter generously share the American experience
in organizing election campaigns and fundraising for
candidates for state legislatures, or perhaps the Indian
experience of community-building in traditionally
caste-bound villages. I do not deny that all the
information may be of some theoretical interest
to some local specialists, but I will say that in Georgia
the practical use of all those lectures, seminars,
and training sessions was pretty much nonexistent …
Expert knowledge of India, combined with complete
ignorance of Georgia … was both insulting and
humorous, neither facilitating the learning process
nor contributing to the reputation of the international
experts. (Haindrava 2003: 77)
The popularity of capacity building continues
unabated. The following excerpt from the USAID
(2004) ‘A Year in Iraq: Building Democracy’ report
demonstrates the importance ascribed to capacity
building. As part of the US democracy promotion
effort in Iraq, a former official from Colorado was
asked to write a guide explaining how to run a
meeting, how to encourage people to speak and
contribute, and how to resolve disagreements and
reach decisions through compromise. The guide was
translated into Arabic and distributed to all members
of local councils in Iraq. In order to assess how these
lessons had been absorbed, a district council meeting
was observed. According to the report:
At the district council meeting, the Iraqi experiment
in democracy seemed to be running off the tracks
when a couple of council members began shouting
their opinions around the table, appearing to be angry
enough to come to blows. (USAID 2004: 12)
The USAID observer was told not to worry by an Iraqi
council member, who explained that the shouting was
only theatrics and that it would not disrupt the process.
While seemingly accepting that this was ‘the Iraqi way’,
the authors express their satisfaction that ‘the
shouting soon gave way to constructive debate; the
council agreed on some issues and deferred others
before it adjourned peacefully’ (USAID 2004: 12).
Although donor policies are indeed an important
factor, we must not disregard the agency and the role
of the NGO leaders and members in developing or
transition countries who, for various reasons, ranging
from a sincere belief in the values of civil society and
democracy to the more banal, pragmatic need to
make a living, embraced the models, discourses,
ideologies and projects promoted by donors. In the
context of economic upheaval, impoverishment and
crises, this led to some opportunistic use of aid
funding. The misuse of aid money is hardly a shocking
revelation: however, the actual misappropriation or





























Genetically engineered civil society
Katherine Verdery (1996) contends that since the
demise of communism, Western capitalist societies
have come to believe that they have a monopoly on
truth and can therefore dispense wisdom about how
to build the ‘proper’ forms of democracy and
capitalism. This, the critics charge, led to the
promotion of a single (i.e.Western) model of civil
society that ignores other traditions and
understandings (Parekh 2004: 22). According to
Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy promoters pass
through these countries [in Africa, Asia and the Middle
East] on hurried civil society assessment missions
and declare that “very little civil society exists”
because they have found only a handful of
Westernised NGOs devoted to non-partisan public-
interest advocacy work on the national side’
(Carothers 1999: 248). Since donor-defined civil
society (that is, professional NGOs) did not exist in
many places or was believed to have been tainted,
donors engaged in a process of building society from
scratch (Mandel 2002: 282).
This led to the promotion of a particular model of
civil society and democracy, and encouraged the
creation of what I refer to as ‘genetically engineered
civil societies.’ With the injection of external funding
(the growth hormones), these genetically engineered
civil societies experienced spectacularly rapid growth
that would have not occurred organically. Similar to
genetically modified crops, they also began to
colonise and squeeze out all indigenous competitors,
becoming the dominant type in their environment. In
the process, in many places existing civil society lost
its diversity and was reduced to professionalised
NGOs that were engaged in advocacy or service
delivery and that supported, in theory if not in practice,
liberal Western values. Through this approach, which
has also been termed ‘institutional modelling’
(Carothers 2000), organisations and actors were
rewarded on the basis of their success in imitating
that particular model and its associated discourses.
Subsequently, groups that did not replicate these
practices and discourses, such as nationalist
organisations and activist groups, were ignored or
marginalised by donors and soon came to view
themselves as real civil society, in contrast to the
donor-created and- supported NGOs. In Latin
America, as Jenny Pearce (2004) discusses, this led to
divisions between organisations that considered
themselves builders, and those that considered
themselved critics, of democracy building. The critics
(social organisations) not only view the builders
(professionalised NGOs) as having been co-opted by
the state, but also consider them as advocates of the
neo-liberal economic agenda (Pearce 2004: 63).
Sabine Freizer also differentiates between the donor-
supported ‘neo-liberal’ and the ‘communal’ civil
societies that have developed in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, and discusses the lack of mixing of goals
and approaches between these parallel forms (Freizer
2004). She points out the lack of grassroots support or
recognition for such neo-liberal organisations. Such
developments have led to discussions about the
unintended consequences of civil society
strengthening programmes in many parts of the
world and concerns that NGOs are donor driven,
upwardly accountable and disconnected from their
own communities and constituencies (Abramson
1999; Adamson 2002; Bruno 1997; Glasius et al. 2004;
Hann 2004; Helms 2003; Hemment 2004; Henderson
2003; Howell and Pearce 2002; Ishkanian 2003, 2004;
Mendelson 2002; McMahon 2002; Pearce 2004;
Obadare 2004; Sampson 2002; Wedel 2001).
In addition to the funding of projects and
organisations, a major component of the technical
aspect of democracy promotion programmes involved
the capacity building and training of trainers. Capacity
building has been used to teach individuals a series of
skills, including how to create and manage NGOs,
how to apply for grants, how to prepare reports and so
on. Having participated in a number of capacity
building exercises designed for NGO activists in
Armenia, I found that training, in addition to teaching
a particular skill (for example, how to fundraise) also
implicitly communicated the donors’ expectations by
teaching local actors which topics were open to
discussion and which kinds of knowledge and
discourses were considered valuable. While never
criticising them publicly, many NGO members I
interviewed in Armenia complained that the training
often provided superficial, one-size fits all answers to
problems, and information that was not applicable to
the local context. They also resented the large sums
spent on the trainers’ per diem, their five-star hotel





























Teaching democracy: representatives of NGOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo learn about democracy and elections
8 I am grateful to Mary Kaldor for drawing my attention
to this point.
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Box 4.3: Civil society and democratisation in the ‘colour revolutions’
The ‘colour revolutions’ were a series of protest movements that emerged in several post-socialist countries
following fraudulent elections by authoritarian governments. They took the form of massive street demonstrations
that led to the overthrow of the ruling regimes by new coalitions committed to political reform and democratisation
The revolutions are so-named because of their non-violent resistance and the symbolic use of colours or
flowers by supporters. NGOs, in particular youth and student activist groups, played a key role in organising
the street demonstrations and creative non-violent resistance. The colour revolutions refer to the Rose
Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
(2005). Some scholars also consider the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution of 2000, which led to the overthrow of
Slobodan Miloševic´, as an influential forerunner of the colour revolutions. This revolution was led by Otpor
(Resistance), which became an important knowledge source for, and trainer of, the subsequent movements.
In Georgia, following fraudulent elections in November 2003, and galvanized by the Kmara (Enough) youth
movement and the Liberty Institute, protestors thronged the streets of Tbilisi carrying roses – a symbol of
non-violence. Georgia’s Rose Revolution forced President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign; and he was
replaced by Mikhail Saakashvili after new elections in March 2004.
In Ukraine, as rumours of fraudulent second round elections circulated, opposition leader Viktor
Yushchenko called for mass public protests. Wearing orange or carrying orange flags, the colour of
Yushchenko’s campaign coalition, demonstrators poured onto the streets and squares. The youth movement
Pora (High Time!) coordinated the mass protests, acts of civil disobedience, sit-ins and general strikes during
the Orange Revolution. The movement resulted in a re-run of the election and Yushchenko’s victory.
Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution of 2005 was led by a new movement, Kelkel (Renaissance), which was
modelled on Otpor and Pora. In the wake of fraudulent elections, activists seized control of several towns in
southern Kyrgyzstan and called on President Askar Akaev to resign. The demonstrations spread to the north
of the country, and when a 10,000 strong demonstration, led by Kelkel, was attacked by Akaev supporters, a
riot broke out and the presidential palace was stormed. The violence of the Tulip Revolution, in which at least
three people were killed, contrasted with the peaceful change of the other colour revolutions.
Common features
The experiences of the first democratic revolutions offered a model, which was spread by NGOs and adapted
according to local circumstances by social movements. Four key characteristics of the colour revolutions have
been identified:
1. civil society organisations’ use of fraudulent elections to mobilise against regimes
2. foreign support for the development of local democratic movements
3. the organisation of radical youth movements using unconventional protest tactics and non- violent resistance
4. the importance of transnational linkages (Beissinger 2005).
1. All of the colour revolutions were electoral revolutions, and used the occasion of a stolen election to
organise mass protests led by a coalition of civil organisations. For example, the Orange Revolution’s central
civic organisation was Pora, whose yellow wing - named after the colour of their symbols - formed part of the
Freedom of Choice Coalition, which was active in election monitoring. This coalition organised massive
protests in cities across Ukraine; the largest, in Kiev's Independence Square, attracted an estimated 500,000
participants, which was unprecedented.
2. The financial support of foreign donors and mainly American NGOs was critical to the emergence of local
democratic movements (Wilson 2006). Through the democracy promotion programmes in Ukraine prior to the
Orange revolution, the United States spent an estimated $65 million, which was channelled mainly through
foreign NGOs to Ukrainian NGOs and social movements (Beissinger 2005). In Georgia, the local branch of the
Soros Foundation supported Kmara’s election support programme with $350,000, and other NGOs also received
significant financial and organisational support from the National Democratic Institute (Stojanovic 2004).
3. The rise of radical youth organisations influenced the tactics of the movement. Due to the young age
composition of NGOs, the internet became a major location, not only for mobilisation and the diffusion of
information, but for humour and ridicule of the authorities (Kuzio 2006). For example, the intellectual abilities
of Ukrainian presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych were ridiculed in youth NGO circles and on websites
after it emerged the ‘Professorship’ listed on his CV was fictitious (Chornuhuza 2005). In addition to this
humour, the Ukrainian movement’s activities were infused with a carnivalesque atmosphere; for instance, the
hymn of the Orange revolution was downloaded 1.5 million times from the internet in 2004 (Kuzio 2006). Non-
violent resistance was common to all the colour revolutions – a tactic inspired by the work of Gene Sharp
(1993), the guru of non-violent resistance in the West, and then disseminated by NGO training centres
(Beissinger 2006).
4. The successful operations of the main NGOs could not have developed without the experience of others, and
the transnational linkages that allowed those lessons to be shared. For instance, the Soros Foundation
supported a trip by Georgian civil society activists to Belgrade where they met with Otpor activists and learnt
about non-violent resistance techniques. This inspired the creation of Kmara, which grew into a broad-based
movement of 3000 students (Beissinger 2006). Before the Orange Revolution, 14 Pora leaders were trained in
Serbia at the Centre for Non-Violent Resistance, an organisation created by Otpor activists to teach youth
leaders how to organise a movement, how to motivate voters, and how to develop mass actions. Pora also
provided summer camps in civil disobedience training for its members (Yablokova 2004).
Diffusion
The success of each revolution provided impetus for neighbouring countries in the post-Soviet region.
Democratic youth groups such as ‘Walking Without Putin’, the Red Pora or the Orange Moscow, were formed
in Russia, while in Belarus, the youth movement Zubr (Bison) became more active in this period. Similar
movements emerged later in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the activists trained often by Pora. Youth movements
modelled on Otpor were also created in Albania, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. The so-called ‘Cedar Revolution’ in
Lebanon also gained some inspiration from the Orange and the Rose Revolutions.
Despite the spread of the colour revolutions, the role of NGOs in the emergence of these revolutions has
been highly criticised by academics on one side, and governments in the region on the other. The primary
critique has been that NGOs are foreign agents of Western democracy promotion; for example, some argue
that the Orange Revolution was ‘made in the USA’ (Wilson 2006: 3). The colour revolutions have also
engendered a backlash against civil society in several authoritarian regimes (Carothers 2006; Howell et. al.
2007), with the result that some NGOs have been closed down by the authorities. For instance, the Soros
Foundation no longer operates in Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan because of the growing
hostility of those governments towards what is perceived as assistance to ‘revolutionary
organisations’(Beissinger 2005). Finally, some analysts doubt that in the long term these revolutions will
influence the process of democratisation significantly.
Before the national elections in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev criticised Western interference
through NGOs:
They [parliament] have seen the dangers that arose in neighbouring countries when foreign N.G.O.s insolently
pumped in money and destabilized society. The state was defenceless against this. (Karajkov 2005:1)
A Russian law passed in 2006 portrays ‘NGOs as imported, unnatural, un-Russian implants’ (Kuzio 2006: 12).
In 2006, Kazakhstan modified its law on NGOs to control their activities and require consent for foreign
financing (Wilson 2006). Similar legislation and regime propaganda is also evident in Belarus. The increasing


























































































and civil society promotion not only has a negative
impact on how NGOs are perceived (such as corrupt
and opportunistic), but also on how the ideas they
promote are received.
I recognise the diversity of civil society actors’
motivations and I do not wish in any way to portray all
NGO actors as being driven by economic incentives.
However, the fact remains that in the 1990s, creating
or joining NGOs became an economic survival
strategy from countries as far apart as Albania to
Zambia, thanks to the influx of donor aid (Celichowski
2004: 75; Ishkanian 2004; Mandel 2002: 286; Obadare
2004: 159; Sampson 2002: 307). These so-called
‘grant-eaters’ (Ishkanian 2003: 29), ‘civil society
entrepreneurs’(Obadare 2004: 159) or ‘profiteers’
(Kaldor et al. 2007: 111) cashed in on the ‘gold rush’
by engaging in civil society strengthening
programmes. Of course individuals adapt, manipulate
and negotiate ideologies, discourses and projects to
fit their needs, but within the context of aid encounters
they very rarely publicly question the validity of these
approaches and ideas, even if they do so privately and
off the record. Whereas I understand the potential
costs of speaking out (including losing funding and
being labelled a troublemaker), unfortunately, silence
has often been interpreted by donors as a sign of
acceptance of the status quo.
Therefore I argue that donors’ definitions of
democracy building and civil society, and the
operationalisation of civil society, have affected local
processes of democracy building and have raised
questions about the viability of externally driven
democracy promotion programmes.
Conflating democracy promotion with
regime change
Finally, in recent years the crisis of democracy in the
West has made democracy promotion much more
difficult as claims of undemocratic behaviour in
others are met with charges of hypocrisy. The ex post
facto justification for the Iraq war as a form of
democracy promotion has meant that democracy
promotion has been confused or conflated with
regime change. At present, suspicion about and
resistance to US democracy promotion activities in
developing and post-socialist countries is at an all-
time high (Carothers 2006). Far from having won
hearts and minds in the Middle East, it appears that
the US justification for the war in Iraq has ‘given
democracy promotion a bad name’ (Halperin 2006).
The perceived presence of the US ‘shadowy guiding
hand’ in the colour revolutions has also intensified the
criticism and scepticism toward democracy
promotion in the former Soviet states. Four years on
from the first colour revolution (that is, the Rose
Revolution in Georgia), optimism has declined and
democratic development remains under serious
question in all the countries that experienced a colour
revolution (Beissinger 2006; see box 4.3). Following
these revolutions, allegations of interventionism and
imperialism have intensified as the authorities in
many former Soviet states attribute the ‘directive’ and
‘top down approaches’ to foreign meddling in what
they consider internal political affairs.
Such criticisms are not limited to Iraq or the former
Soviet states. For instance, US support for the NGO
SUMATE (Join Up) in Venezuela, which has received
support from NED and USAID, is described by critics
as having been created with the sole purpose of
getting rid of President Hugo Chavez and replacing
him with someone who is on friendlier terms with the
US (Gindin 2005; see box 4.4). William Robinson
describes the objectives of US democracy promotion
in Venezuela as undermining authentic democracy by
gaining control over popular movements for
democratisation, keeping a lid on popular democracy
movements, and limiting any change that may be
brought about by mass democratisation movements
so that the outcomes of democracy struggles do not
threaten the elite order and integration into global
capitalism. (Robinson and Gindin 2005)
Although at times these critics tend to ignore some of
Chavez’s authoritarian policies, they do articulate the
growing questioning of the motives behind American
democracy promotion.
Increasingly there are arguments that democracy
promotion and civil society aid are beginning to be
used in the way that human rights became a cynical
tool in the Cold War, where violations in Brazil under
military rule or Pinochet’s Chile were ignored because
these regimes were anti-Communist and part of the
‘free world’ (Kaldor 2003: 52). Today the double
standards of supporting ‘friendly tyrants’ in Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, as well as claims about
extraordinary rendition and the use of torture in Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, are compromising
for a successful democratisation in the region.
However, others argue that unless there is a genuine domestic mass movement against an authoritarian
regime, foreign support will have little effect (Wilson 2006). Moreover, most of the original protest campaigns
were funded domestically. The majority of the foreign finance went on training and maintenance. According to
Amchuk (2004) the cost of organising the protest in Kiev’s central square was equivalent to US $3.8 million,
which was raised without foreign support. Beissinger (2006), Herd (2005) and others agree that the financial
support of Western countries and NGOs was crucial, but that these revolutions emerged from domestic
dissatisfaction and were not instigated from abroad.
Finally, some critics argue neither the goals nor the outcome of the colour revolutions were revolutionary, or
led to dramatic regime change (Jones 2006). In the Rose Revolution people did not expect the resignation of
Shevardnadze; they were more concerned with transparency of the government, removal of the old
nomenclature and more reforms. After the revolution, changes including new constitutional amendments in
favour of the executive, and increased accountability of the administration, did not lead to radical
transformations. As Jones says: ‘And has the Rose Revolution over the last two years transformed itself into a
‘Rosy Revolution’, based on public relations rather than genuine democratic change?’ (2006: 7). The long term
impact of the colour revolutions on democracy building remains to be seen.
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democracy promotion efforts and feeding into the
emerging backlash against civil society and
democracy promotion.
Conclusion
‘Democracy is not instant coffee’ stated Benita
Ferrerro-Waldner, the European Commissioner for
External Relations and ENP in a recent speech (2006).
Her comment represents the pragmatic attitude that
has replaced the euphoria and optimism of the early
1990s. After nearly two decades of democracy
promotion, donors remain committed to civil society
strengthening, but they are re-evaluating their earlier
approaches and formulating new strategies. In this
period of reckoning, we are faced with questions of
how and whether democracy should be promoted
through externally funded programmes. Is continued
civil society strengthening the way forward? What
about support to state actors? Or political parties?
The results of democracy promotion thus far have
been varied. Indeed, democracy has been
(re)established in many countries. Moreover, if we
consider the spread of formal or procedural
democracies, then democracy promotion programmes
can be and are deemed a success.9 However, if we
consider the development and spread of substantive
democracies, then it is clear that donor-supported
democracy promotion and civil society strengthening
programmes have not met with great success
because, although the mechanisms and institutions
have been created, we are not witnessing greater civic
participation, engagement and inclusion. It is not
uncommon to hear about ‘virtual’ and ‘managed’
democracies. In many instances donor civil society
strengthening programmes, while leading to the
exponential growth of NGOs, have also thwarted
natural political processes and imposed a particular
model of democracy and civil society. This tendency
has led to an ‘abortion of local processes of change’
(Hann 2004: 46) and tamed social movements (Kaldor
2003). Some even suggest that donor civil society
strengthening programmes risk ‘inhibiting and
ultimately destroying the most important purposes of
civil society … the freedom to imagine that the world
could be different’ (Howell and Pearce 2002: 237).
These concerns, however, are only part of the story.
The reality is far more complex because, in spite of the
taming, co-optation, and backlash, there is still much
emancipatory potential left in civil society and it is
important not to deny the agency of civil society actors
around the world for challenging hegemonic
discourses and powerful actors, as well as contesting
oppressive regimes.
As the development of civil society and, indeed,
democracy is no longer solely restricted to national
boundaries, outside actors, be they foreign donors,
diasporic networks or global civil society activists,
cannot be excluded from the equation. Global actors
are implicated in and shape national/local processes
in a multitude of ways, including providing financial
assistance, training, and supporting exchanges and
education abroad. Actually existing global civil society
is complex and contradictory (Kaldor et al. 2007: 119);
it can contribute to peace, stability and justice just as
it can foment conflict, instability and exclusion. While
some global civil society actors (such as NGOs) are
engaged in democracy promotion through civil society
strengthening programmes, this is not the most
important contribution of global civil society. The
greatest contribution of global civil society is its
potential to enhance communication by creating
‘islands of engagement’ (Kaldor 2003: 160), where
diverse actors will find opportunities for discussion,
participation and debate. If global civil society can do
this and also encourage greater self-reflection by
Northern actors about the state of their own
democracy (and not only discussions about the status
of democracy in the South), then it will go a long way
in revitalising and reinvigorating democracy and of
course, civil society.
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Box 4.4: Súmate (Join Up): promoting and defending democracy in Venezuela
Súmate (Join Up) is a private non-profit association, founded by opposition activists, Alejandro Plaz and María Corina
Machado, and a group of Venezuelan citizens in 2002, with the objective of promoting individual liberty and the free
exercise of citizen’s constitutional rights. Today, the organisation has more than 30,000 volunteers.
Plaz and Machado were employed in the private sector until they founded Súmate, Plaz was a senior partner for
McKinsey & Company in Latin America, and Machado worked for a car parts manufacturer (National Review Online 2006).
According to Golinger (2005), Súmate’s mission is to ‘promote a recall referendum against President Chávez,, a
participatory instrument introduced in Venezuela’s Constitution of 1999, with the support of the Chávez government.
However, Súmate describes its mission as being to ‘…promote, defend, facilitate and support the complete exercise
of political rights the Venezuelan Constitution grants to every one of its citizens’ (Súmate URL). Its stated goals and
values are:
• The guarantee of civil and political freedom and rights
• Impartial and independent citizen participation in democratic processes
• Professional volunteerism with a high level of citizen participation
• Organisational transparency and efficacy
Súmate has engaged in a number of activities in its effort to promote and defend democracy in Venezuela,
including the collection and processing of signatures for the recall referendum; the collection and processing of the
signatures for a constitutional amendment; and the design, planning and coordination of the Firmazo (the Big
Signing) of February 2003. In addition, Súmate runs several projects that include the consolidation of the national
web of volunteers, the diagnosis and analysis of the permanent national electoral registry, the planning and
execution of the parallel manual counting of the votes to strengthen transparency and trust in electoral processes,
and educational projects implemented through its numerous volunteers (Súmate 2004).
Because of Súmate’s open objections to the many steps President Hugo Chávez has taken to consolidate his
power, the organisation has been described as an ‘enemy of the people’ by the Venezuelan government (O’Grady
2005). Both founders, Plaz and Machado, are being accused of a conspiracy ‘to alter the Republican order’ under the
Venezuelan Penal Code, and are currently awaiting trial. Other active members, such as Luis Enrique Palacios and
Ricardo Estévez, face the same charges, but as accomplices. The Prosecutor Ortega Díaz has requested the
maximum penalty for the crime of conspiracy, which is 16 years.
Critics argue that Súmate is not an impartial organisation, even though Súmate describes itself as a civil
association that is not concerned with who governs but rather with safeguarding democracy in Venezuela. The
criticism surrounding Súmate stems largely from the perception that it is funded and influenced by foreign actors.
The conspiracy charge mentioned above, for instance, is linked to the grant received by the US National Endowment
for Democracy (NED). In September 2003, Súmate signed a contract with the NED for a US$53,400 grant for the
implementation of a programme of non-partisan elections education. However, only $31,000 was used by the
organisation to develop its educational project and the rest of the grant was returned to the NED. (O’Grady 2005).
In addition to the NED grant, Súmate has also received funds from the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
USAID and the Canadian Embassy (interview with Súmate 2007).1 The USAID grant was part of the agency’s
programme, launched in August 2002, to provide assistance to maintain democratic stability and strengthen
Venezuela’s fragile democratic institutions (USAID/OTI 2006).
Súmate’s director, Alejandro Plaz, says that only 5% of the organisation’s total funding comes directly from foreign
entities. In an interview held in May 2007, he said:
Súmate’s funding comes primarily from Venezuelan citizens concerned with the current situation our country is living.
Deposits are made through several national bank accounts the organistion owns, for as little as $1, if desired, by any
one who wishes.
Aside from the arguments about foreign funding, critics point to the relationship between Súmate’s leaders and the Bush
administration. For example, a meeting between Machado and President Bush in the White House in 2005, caused an outcry
and criticism from the government in Caracas. Venezuela’s foreign minister, Alí Rodríguez Araque, called the meeting ‘a
provocation’, and the interior minister, Jesse Chacón, called Machado ‘a puppet of the CIA’, continuing the heated rhetoric
that has characterised the relationship between the Bush administration and Venezuela’s president (Ceaser 2005).
9 For instance, a recent USAID-commissioned study, ‘Effects
of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results
of a Cross-National Quantitative Study,’ used Freedom House
and Polity IV measures to examine the impact of US
democracy promotion programmes worldwide. As one of the
authors of the study said, ‘We found that when the United
States spends money to promote democracy in foreign
countries, it works’ (Finkel et. al. 2006). The authors of the
report attribute the growth of democracy to US assistance
and write, ‘USAID Democracy and Governance obligations
have a significant positive impact on democracy, while all
other US and non-US assistance variables are statistically
insignificant’ (Finkel et al. 2006: 83, emphasis added).





























































Golinger (2005) states the Venezuelan government
believes the promotion of a recall referendum against
the President, though within the constitutional rights of
all Venezuelans, is inherently a partisan act. According to
the Venezuelan government, Súmate was specifically
‘promoting’ and campaigning for a referendum against
President Chávez, with the goal of prematurely
terminating his mandate, utilising the funding from the
NED, along with additional grants from USAID and funds
from the National Democratic Institute and the
International Republican Institute, both entities financed
by NED and USAID (Golinger 2006).
The recall referendum held in August 2004 was
defeated with a 59% ‘NO’ vote, and even though the US
based Carter Center (2005) concluded the results were
accurate, the European Union observers could not
monitor the referendum because of the restrictions
imposed upon them by the Venezuelan government (de
Cordoba and Luhnow 2004). An exit poll by Penn, Schoen
& Berland Associates (PSB), in which Súmate personnel
participated, predicted Chávez would loose by 20%,
whereas the election results showed him winning by the
same percentage. Schoen said of the referendum, ‘I think it was a massive fraud’ (Barone 2004).
The Venezuelan democracy, Súmate points out, was set up with a separation of powers, an independent judiciary,
civil rights and provisions for free and fair elections. Súmate believes that the electoral processes under Chávez
have not been transparent and fair, stating that the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional
Electoral, CNE) is biased and controlled by the government. They also believe the Venezuelan state does not possess
a clear separation of powers, which futher complicates the issue of transparency in electoral and other democratic
processes (interview with Súmate 2007).
Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a preliminary draft NGO law with provisions similar to those in Uzbek
and Russian legislation. Venezuela would require all local civic organisations to register as legal entities with a new
regulatory body, in addition to complying with existing civil code and tax laws. Registered groups would have to
provide detailed information on donations and donors. The Venezuelan government would monitor and control all
international contributions to civil society groups. Instead of using state banks, the government would establish a
regulatory board to filter donations. This ‘agency for international cooperation’ would have full discretion to issue or
withhold funds based on the government’s own criteria. It could also give money to causes that donors never
intended to sponsor (Johnson 2005).
Huguette Labelle (2006), Chair of Transparency International, states:
strong democracies are built on a solid foundation of freedom: freedom to speak out, to organise and to operate without
government interference. This law’s excessive regulation would undermine those basic rights. The role of civil society, to
help protect the interests and rights of society in general, would be hindered.
According to Amnesty International, President Chávez ‘must respect the right of non-governmental human rights
organizations to carry out their legitimate work, such work is underpinned by international human rights treaties
which the Venezuelan government has willingly pledged to uphold’ (Amnesty International 2004).
Súmate experience illustrates the pertinent and often contentious issues for civil society organisations seeking to
promote democracy: donor interventions, agendas, and influences; and sovereignty and nationalism (Howell and
Pearce 2002). If an NGO is partly funded by international institutions with clear links to the US government does it
mean a foreign government is meddling in another’s internal affairs, thus breaching its sovereignty? Where does one
draw the line between promoting democracy and foreign intervention on domestic affairs?
Manuela Plaza, postgraduate student in MSc NGOs and Development, LSE
A protestor demonstrates against President Hugo Chavez
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By substantive democracy, I mean a process, which
has to be continually reproduced, for maximising the
opportunities for all individuals to shape their own
lives and to participate in and influence debates about
public decisions that affect them. (Kaldor 2008)
Democracy, to be sure, requires the respect for basic
political rights and civil liberties, such as a multiparty
political system, free and fair elections, freedom of
expression and organisation. But this is what we might
call a thin, or minimalist concept of democracy as
opposed to a thick, or wider definition (Kekic 2007).
Democracy is more than the sum of its institutions and
procedures. In a substantive sense, democracy is
embedded on society, nurtured and enhanced by a
vibrant civil society and a civic culture of participation,
responsibility and debate. That is why democracy is
always a work in progress, an unfinished journey, a
process rooted in the history of any given society. That
is also why it cannot be imposed from the outside and
is never achieved once and for all.
So far, no Latin American country has relapsed into
dictatorship. However, the proliferation of corruption
scandals and the rising levels of criminal violence
combined with the persistence of poverty and
inequality are at the root of a profound sense of
disconnection between people’s aspirations and the
capacity of political institutions to respond to the
demands of society. The root causes of this growing
political instability are to be found in the deep political,
economic and social changes undertaken by Latin
America over the last two decades. Every country in
the region, with the exception, again, of Cuba,
underwent not one, but two, radical transformations:
the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and the
opening up of closed and stagnant economies.
Democracy authorised the full expression of long
repressed demands for social change. For most
countries, however, the restoration of political and
civil liberties went hand-in-hand with times of
economic and social hardship. The oil crises and huge
debts of the 1980s drove national economies to the
verge of bankruptcy. The combination of rampant
inflation and economic stagnation threatened the very
fabric of social life.
The crisis of the Latin American developmentalist
model of the 1960s and 1970s, based on internal
markets and import substitution, coincided with the
sweeping changes brought about by globalisation. A
state-centred vision of national development, deeply
ingrained in Latin American political culture and
institutions, came into sharp conflict with the
demands of global competitive capitalism. Internal
needs and external pressure led to a second drastic
process of change: the reform of the state and the
opening up of closed national economies to global
trade, privatisation and fiscal adjustment.
Globalisation, however, is not only an economic or
technological process. It is also a political, social and
cultural phenomenon. It is not only about financial
flows and goods being exchanged in the global market
arena. Globalisation is also about information, values,
symbols and ideas. The modernisation of the
economy and the emergence of open, democratic
societies thus represented a profound historical
change, both in the patterns of development and in
the social dynamics of Latin American countries.
To be sure, in most countries, growth resumed after
the lost decade of the 1980s. Wealth, however, remained
unevenly shared. Inequality and high levels of poverty
persisted. Many young people live in despair, with no
sense of future. This frustration, combined with the
incapacity of the political democracy to improve, quickly
and significantly, people’s standards of living is certainly
one of the root causes of the prevailing widespread
sense of hopelessness. The legitimacy crisis affecting
political institutions has been dramatically compounded
by the proliferation of corruption scandals and the rising
levels of criminal violence and incivility, especially in the
region’s large cities. Human security is at risk in Latin


























































DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
Miguel Darcy D'Oliviera
Twenty years after the transition from military
dictatorship to the rule of law, democracy is in crisis
in Latin America. This crisis is also raising questions
and forcing a reappraisal of the role played by civil
society in strengthening democracy in the region. The
manifestations and causes of this crisis, as well as
how to deepen democracy in order to safeguard it, are
the focus of this chapter.
Challenges and threats to democracy in
Latin America
From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, Latin
American countries led the so-called second wave of
democratisation, following southern Europe in the
mid-1970s and preceding Eastern Europe, East Asia
and parts of Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s. For
two decades the peaceful transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule after decades of
repressive military dictatorship and, in Central
America, outright civil war, was deemed a success
story. The only exception in the region to this
democratic trend was Cuba.
This is no longer the case. Over the last five years
democracy has been put to severe test. Since the turn
of the century, more than a third of Latin American
countries – Paraguay (in 2000), Peru (2000), Argentina
(2001), Venezuela (2002), Bolivia (2003 and 2005),
Ecuador (2000 and 2006) – have experienced situations
of acute political risk. In several cases, widespread
public protest led to the downfall of elected presidents.
Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Fernando de la Rúa in
Argentina, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos
Mesa in Bolivia, and Jamil Mahuad and Lucio Gutiérrez
in Ecuador were removed from office by a combination
of social protest in the streets and political action by
parliaments. In Paraguay the military played a key role
in the impeachment of President Raul Cubas Grau. In
Venezuela, a farcical coup d’état, promoted by military
and civil sectors with US support, led to the temporary
overthrow of President Hugo Chávez, who was soon
reinstated, with the full support of democratic leaders
and public opinion throughout the region. To this list
might added situations of extreme tension in the
political system that did not reach the breaking point:
Nicaragua in 2004 and 2005, when President Enrique
Bolaños was threatened with impeachment; Honduras
in 2005 when authorities delayed announcing the
winner of the presidential elections; Brazil in 2005
when the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was
undermined by a wave of political scandals; and Mexico
in 2006 when the opposition candidate, López Obrador,
aggressively contested in the streets the legitimacy of
Felipe Calderon’s election to the presidency.
The recurrence and intensity of these political
crises and risky situations indicate the fragility of
Latin American democracies. Latin America has
entered a new historical phase of crisis, inflection and
political change. Democracy is again at the centre of
the public agenda. It will be safeguarded – and this
will be my main contention in this chapter – only if it is
strengthened and deepened.
With the exceptions of Chile, Uruguay and,
surprisingly, Colombia, despite the permanent threat
to political and civil liberties posed by the drug cartels
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –
People’s Army (FARC) guerrillas, there is throughout
the region a deep and widening public disaffection vis-
à-vis political institutions. All opinion polls
corroborate the deficit of trust and the pervasive
sense of fatigue affecting political parties,
parliaments and governments1. Democracy,
therefore, must be made to work or apathy, cynicism
and disenchantment will facilitate the resurgence of
authoritarianism under old or new disguises.
In chapter 2 of this volume, Mary Kaldor argues for
a concept of substantive democracy as something
deeper or ‘thicker’ than formal democracy:
1 A region-wide opinion poll conducted in 2006 by
Latinobarometro indicates that although 54 per cent of Latin
Americans believe there can be no democracy without political
parties, only 19 per cent have any trust in political parties.
Supporters of Mexico's opposition candidate Lopez Obrador took
to the streets in 2006
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already subjected to restrictions and interferences. In
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, mechanisms of direct
democracy are being used to grant unlimited power to
the presidency, by-passing parliament and
undermining representative democracy.
Populism is, however, more than just a risk to
representative democracy. It is also and foremost a
risk to substantive democracy. The imposition of
increasing controls by the state over society directly
contradicts the gradual building and strengthening of
open societies in Latin America. It also exercises a
strong fascination over large sectors of Latin
American civil society that are still enraptured by the
revolutionary myth. It is important to remember that
the dream of a radical transformation of the
established order remains alive throughout the region
in social movements ranging from the neo-Zapatistas
of Subcomandante Marcos in Mexico to the Landless
Peasant Movement in Brazil, not to mention the
narco-guerrilleros of Colombia who still see
themselves as revolutionaries. The triumphal
reception accorded to President Chávez at the fifth
World Social Forum at Porto Alegre in 2005 is an
eloquent example of the incantatory power for non-
governmental organisations and social movements of
the rhetoric of anti-Americanism and anti-
globalisation2.
The forces of renewal: the rise of informed
and empowered citizens
Latin America is at the threshold of a new historical
cycle in which the fault-lines will be defined by the
contrast between old models and new ideas,
authoritarian regression and the deepening of
democracy. This is a situation fraught with risks but
also with challenges and opportunities. Widespread
disaffection towards the political system coexists with
the emergence of new forms of citizen participation
and civic culture that may well prove to be the best
antidote to the resurgence of populism. Latin
American societies have changed drastically in the
last few decades. These changes have deeply affected
the relationship between civil society, the state and
democracy. NGOs and social movements were at the
forefront of the struggle for democracy in the 1970s
and 1980s. With the traditional channels of
participation – political parties, unions – having been
blocked by the dictatorship, the only available






























Impunity and insecurity, combined with persistent
poverty and inequality, account for much of the
profound sense of disconnection between people’s
aspirations and the capacity of the political system to
respond to the demands of society. The democratic
transition in Latin America created the rules and
institutions of democracy, but in most countries
respect for due process and rule of law is in danger,
at best. Mistrust of politicians, political parties,
parliaments and the judiciary system is paving the
way for the resurgence in several countries of forms
of authoritarian populism that were thought to be
relegated to the past. Nothing is more expressive of
this all-encompassing rejection of the political
establishment than the call – que se vayan todos (they
all must go) – that punctuated the street
demonstrations in Argentina, leading to the overthrow
of three successive presidents in a few days. In some
countries, such as Venezuela, the traditional political
system literally fell apart. In others, the crisis of
legitimacy gave rise to new actors and demands for
radical change.
The resurgence of authoritarian populism
The notion of populism has been used to characterise
the policies of countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and even Argentina. Many
interpret the recent string of electoral victories by
charismatic leaders as a historical turn to the Left in
Latin American politics. A core component of Latin
American neo-populism is the reaffirmation of the
central role of the state. Its leaders vocalise a strident
anti-imperialist and anti-globalisation message but
abstain from defining the utopian way towards the
new society. President Chávez has resorted to the old
Cuban rallying cry of Patria o muerte, venceremos
(Fatherland or death, we shall overcome!) to promote
his Bolivarian Revolution. In his inaugural speech in
January 2007, President Rafael Correa of
Ecuadomade a distinction between una época de
cambios (an epoch of change) and un cambio de época
(a change of epoch) to underline his radicalism.
President Evo Morales’indigenismo appeals to the
ethnic and cultural identities of Bolivia’s indigenous
population as the foundation of his concept of a new
society based on non-Western values.
However, in their call for radical political, economic
and social change, today’s populist leaders differ
significantly from Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan
Perón in Argentina, whose populist regimes shaped
Latin American history in the mid-twentieth century.
These charismatic leaders appealed directly to the
urban masses, ensuring their political allegiance
through an extension of the labour legislation. They
despised representative democracy, promoting the
redistribution of resources but not seeking to change
the prevailing social and economic order. Perón was
strongly anti-American, unlike Vargas, but neither
ever entertained an anti-market stance. Their
reliance on an authoritarian state was more
pragmatic than ideological.
The new populists have in common with their
predecessors a strong reliance on mobilising the
masses against internal and external enemies, as
well as on policies of income redistribution through
social programmes. However, they do not hide their
hostility towards the markets and political pluralism.
Populist leaders speak to people’s hearts and
mobilise powerful symbols and emotions in response
to real or imaginary grievances. They build on the
climate of frustration and disillusionment that makes
people think that the way to the future is a return to
the past – even though it is a romanticised past that,
in fact, has never existed.
This direct association of a charismatic leader with
‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ undermines the
foundations of democracy. It brings with it an
inevitable propensity to impose, always for the greater
good of the people and the nation, controls by the
state over society. This is what is happening in




























Enraptured by the revolutionary myth: a Venezulan supporter of Hugo Chavez dressed as Che Guevara
2 It is hard to equate the resurgence of populism with
the strengthening of the Left in Latin America. Presidents
Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet of Chile, or Tabaré
Vázquez of Uruguay, by virtue of their personal history
and political philosophy, stand much further to the Left than
Hugo Chávez, and they clearly reject his anti-American and
anti-globalisation rhetoric.
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institutional politics and the dominance of everyday
concerns in people’s lives. These profound changes that
shape contemporary societies are increasingly visible and
relevant in Latin American. What is missing is the analysis
of the significance for democracy of this emergence of a
critical mass of informed and empowered citizens.
Anthony Giddens uses the concept of ‘active trust’ to define
the ethos of participation and responsibility at the core of
the democratisation of everyday life:
In almost all spheres of life we have moved from
passive to active trust as the main bond of social
cohesion. Active trust is trust that has to be won from
the other and others; where there is two-way
negotiation rather than dependence; and where that
trust has to be consistently renewed in a deliberate
way. (Giddens 2007: 116)
Today, citizens tend to have multiple, overlapping
identities and interests. Ethnic origin, age group,
religious creed, sexual orientation, and consumption
patterns have become a more powerful source of identity
than social status. We all become what we desire to be
by resisting whatever negates our freedom, and in the
incessant search to give our own life meaning. This
process opens up new linkages between personal life
and public debate, individual freedom and collective
responsibility. The process of self-construction is
inseparable from the dynamic of social transformation.
Citizens capable of making up their minds, deliberating
and taking stands, are at the root of a second
phenomenon of great significance for the strengthening
of substantive democracy: the rising power of public
opinion to shape and influence public debate.
A society less organised but more connected
and interactive
Manuel Castells was one of the first to underline the
change represented by the transition from a public
sphere anchored in political institutions to a public
sphere structured around the communication system,
which he understood both as media and new
information technologies (Castells 1996). Individuals
increasingly elaborate their opinions and choices
based on they way they live and what they see. If their
perception and experience bear no relation to the
message of politicians, the inevitable outcome is
growing disbelief and mistrust3.
The other aspect of this demand for accountability is
people’s capacity to see through and reject
demagogical gestures, empty words and promises as
false solutions to complex problems. George






























freedom at the community level. This kind of
grassroots work represented a break with the Latin
American tradition of looking to the state and at
labour relations as the strategic reference point for
political and social action. With their backs turned to
the state, social activists have promoted an immense
variety of local initiatives that combine the struggle for
civic rights and freedom with concrete projects to
improve people’s daily quality of life. This flexible,
bottom-up approach was profoundly democratic, in so
far as civil society organisations grasped emerging
demands, gave a voice to new actors, empowered
communities, tested innovative solutions and
pressured governments.
This is less true today, for a number of reasons that
it is very important to underline. It is citizen action that
gives life to civil society, and citizen initiatives are as
diverse as the public issues at stake and the energy of
those who mobilise around them. Civil society is not
homogeneous. It is not a realm of the good, guided by
pure and noble values, contrasting with the evils of the
state and the market. Civil society has no controlling
or regulatory body to set action agendas or a
consensus about what to do. Citizens do not ask for
permission to act nor do they conform to any pre-
established hierarchy of priorities. They create their
own, constantly evolving, agenda.
And yet, some activists see in the plurality of
initiatives, actors and causes intrinsic to civil society a
risk of fragmentation and dispersion of energies. For
an important segment of organised Latin American
civil society, the way to restore unity of vision and
purpose lies in a closer alignment with leaders such
as Chávez, Morales or Correa, who are seen as
standard bearers of a Latin American socialism for
the twenty-first century.
This subordination of the diversity of citizen action to
the political imperatives of a uniform, state-centred
strategy of radical social transformation challenges
civil society’s constituent freedom and autonomy.
Citizen participation is multiple, fluid, diverse and, in a
way, it is precisely in its lack of organisation – a
reflection of the growing complexity and fragmentation
of contemporary societies – that its strength resides.
Civil society is not, nor can it be, a political party. Its
goal is not to achieve or exercise state power. Nobody
speaks for civil society, nor has the power or capacity
to define who is part of it or who is excluded from it. It
is, by its very nature, a contested political space, an
arena of debate and innovation, criss-crossed by the
conflicts and controversies present in society. It cannot
be appropriated by any single political project. Its most
visible face is made from organisations and
movements. However, today, this organised
dimension, no longer accounts for the range and
diversity of citizen action. This classical notion of civil
society has to be reframed and enlarged to take into
account emerging actors, processes and spaces.
The decline in the role played by organised civil
society as a driver of democratic change and the
concomitant rise of informed and empowered
individuals and networks is a significant trend that
calls for further scrutiny. It has to do with the
emergence of open and complex societies as well as
with the opportunities for participation and dialogue
that have been opened up by the new information
technologies. Today, ordinary people tend to be more
intelligent, rebellious and creative than in the past, in
so far as they are constantly called upon to make
value judgments and life choices, where previously
there was only conformity to a pre-established
destiny. This enhanced capacity for individuals to
think, deliberate and decide is a consequence of the
decline in the forms of authority based on religion or
tradition. Each of us is daily confronted in our private
life with choices that are no longer dictated by a
supreme authority nor regulated by law.
The experience of our bodies and sexuality, the
decision to get married or not, to maintain the
marriage or opt for separation, to have children or not
to have them, to interrupt an undesired pregnancy or
not to do so, to exercise the right to die with dignity –
all these questions are now open to choice. Even the
preservation of a loving relationship requires constant
care of the other partner, who is also endowed with
desires, aspirations and the capacity to make choices
of his or her own. In the past, tradition and religion
determined identities that were destinies. Today,
identity is the end-result of our choices. Each
individual tries to be or to become what he or she
really is. But, in contemporary society, to quote the
Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, ‘each one is
many’. Identities are as multiple and fluid as our own
repertoire of experiences and belongings.
Alain Touraine observes that ‘the public space is
emptying at the top and filling up at the bottom’ (Touraine
and Khosrokhavar 2000: 31). This formulation keenly




























Citizens are increasingly expressing their identities: Quechua women march
for equal rights in Peru and transsexuals demonstrate in Mexico.
3 The global opposition to the web of lies underpinning the
invasion of Iraq, and the exemplary reaction of the Spanish
people, who punished the government of Jose Maria Aznar for
its attempt to manipulate information about the perpetrators
of the Madrid terrorist attack in March 2004, are two recent
and eloquent examples of the call for truth and transparency
as a paramount political value.
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in national opinion against ratification: gun control
was rejected by 64 per cent of the electorate.
Enlightened public opinion and political analysts were
stunned. On the one hand, the broad discussion
preceding the vote showed the untapped potential of
the Internet in a developing country as a space for
horizontal communication and public debate. On the
other hand, the outcome expressed ordinary people’s
capacity to confront arguments with their own
experience and make up their own minds about
complex and emotional issues. This example also
demonstrates that citizens tend to be much more
creative and innovative than politicians in handling
new technologies. Blogs, emails, cell phones and
Internet sites are becoming enabling tools for a new
type of communication: personal, participatory and
interactive. Society is apparently less organised but it
is more connected and participatory.
The main hurdle to overcome in the path to
substantive democracy is not, therefore,
disinformation or apathy on the part of the population.
It is politicians’ incapacity to understand, respect and
trust the capacity of the citizenry – or at least, the
extreme difficulty they experience in trying to do so.
Latin American countries such as Brazil, Colombia,
Chile and Mexico are unjust and yet vibrant societies,
marked by high levels of social mobility and new forms
of citizen participation. The dynamism of such
societies calls for more efficient and less arrogant
actions by the state, based on dialogue not monologue,
partnership not imposition, argument not empty
rhetoric, and autonomy not bureaucratic centralism.
New actors, processes and tools for public debate
are making the interaction between citizens and
political institutions much more unpredictable and
complex. Democracies are evolving into a space for
collective dialogue and public deliberation. What
matters today is not a fluid ‘will of all’, but the
participation of all concerned in the deliberation. The
legitimacy of the decision-making process will
increasingly depend on its openness and
transparency. This transformation is a formidable
challenge to the democratic imagination. Increasing
citizen participation and deliberation calls for a
radically new style of political leadership. Democracy
is a long process of incremental change and it now
involves many actors: media, public opinion and
parliament. There is no longer space – even though
the ardent expectation is always there – for a heroic
gesture by the leader that, in a stroke, responds to the
people’s needs. The democratic leaders will be those
open to dialogue and committed to harnessing the
energy and creativity of an informed society4.
Citizen participation, civic culture and
substantive democracy
In complex systems, order is not imposed from the top
down by a centre of command and control. Neither
does social change occur according to uniform and
pre-established strategies. Change is an ongoing
process that occurs simultaneously at multiple points.
Personal freedom and technological innovation release
creative social energy. Pioneering actions, innovative
experiences, exemplary projects and unexpected
interactions take many shapes, flow along multiple
pathways and radiate at great speed. These
decentralised initiatives produce an impact on the
system as a whole, generating a critical mass of new
ideas, messages, proposals, knowledge and
experiences. Connectors and communicators amplify
and re-transmit these innovations in a continuous
dynamic of experimentation, learning, feedback,
reorganisation and expansion. Power is moving from
the centre to the periphery, from vertical command and
control structures to horizontal networks and
collaborative platforms. Communication is,
increasingly, participative, interactive and collaborative.
In this rapidly evolving context, the transformation
of society is a collective process of changing
mindsets, practices and structures, not the result of
an act of unilateral political will. The responsibility of
the democratic leader is to grasp the challenges,




























Movement (PASOK) in Greece, says people want a new
relationship with power. As they experience a sense of
greater freedom and autonomy in their daily lives, they
also want to be respected in their ability to understand
problems, to take a stand and to act (Barnett 2004).
Informed citizens no longer accept the role of passive
audience. They want to be actors, not spectators. They
want to speak and to be heard. They want the truth to
be told to them in a straightforward way, and they want
to be sure their contribution will be taken into account.
Consider the case of Brazil, a country with a low
level of formal education but with extended access to
information through television. There are several
examples in recent history of situations in which
citizens showed that they are fully capable of
understanding complex problems, evaluating
arguments, overcoming prejudice and coming up with
innovative answers. To the astonishment of many,
ordinary people overwhelmingly supported President
Cardoso’s Plano Real (Real Plan) of 1994, the complex
strategy to stabilise the currency and curb inflation,
support that actively contributed to its success. The
national plan to combat the spread of HIV and AIDS
generated profound changes in mindsets and
patterns of behaviour, thanks to information
messages reaching out to all segments of the
population in the clearest possible language. Faced in
2001 with the immediate risk of acute power
shortages, again people reacted in a surprising way by
voluntarily changing their energy consumption
patterns on a much broader scale than had been
requested by government policy makers.
Similar examples can be found in other countries of
the region. Their common message is that when
leaders acknowledge the capacity of ordinary people,
when knowledge and information are provided about
what is at stake, when credible calls are made for
citizen participation and involvement, the popular
response tends to be extensive and vigorous. The
surprising result of the October 2005 referendum in
Brazil on the prohibition of the sale of arms and
munitions can also be understood in the light of these
new forms of participation and deliberation. Concern
with urban violence and criminality is by far the top
priority in all public opinion polls. Brazil comes
second only to Venezuela in the number of people
killed by guns. Imposing legal restrictions on the
commercialisation of guns and ammunition had long
been a demand of groups concerned with human
rights and urban violence. Sensitive to pressure by the
media and public opinion, Congress approved
legislation severely restricting the gun trade with the
provision that the law should be ratified by the people
in a national referendum, scheduled for 2005. A
couple of months before the vote, opinion polls
estimated popular support of ratification to be 75 per
cent of the electorate. The Yes campaign was backed
by an overwhelming majority of politicians, religious
and civic leaders, opinion makers and the media. The
outcome seemed a foregone conclusion.
And yet the unexpected happened. The virtual
consensus in favor of gun control started to be
challenged in blogs and websites. A variety of
arguments opened up a process of heated discussion.
Opponents denounced the approved legislation as a
false, simplistic solution to the complex, dramatic
problem of violence, arguing that it reduced
government responsibility to ensure public safety.
Others spoke about risks to individual freedom and
civic rights. Blogs and virtual communities were
created overnight. Friends and colleagues shared
emails about contrasting points of view.Ideas were
confronted in an extensive conversation that spread to
the workplace and many households. People who
usually took stands along clear-cut lines started to
defend conflicting opinions. With the opening up of
television prime time for both sides to argue their
case and with mandatory voting, the debate expanded
to the entire population.
Voters listened to the arguments and evaluated
them based on their personal experience of violence
and criminality. Citizens felt challenged to elaborate
and sustain their views and possibly to change their




























Brazilians responded to a creative safe sex campaign
Latin Americans citizens are proving more adept than politicians in
handling new communications technologies



























































a growing call for truth, respect and transparency.
Either the leader inspires and mobilises around a
vision of the future or the loss of power is inevitable.
So far these new forms of citizen action and civic
culture have not revitalised the political system. If the
gap between politics and society remains unbridged,
they may – paradoxically – contribute to further
undermine representative democracy. To acknowledge
the emergence of these new processes of social
participation and communication does not imply their
idealisation. Freedom and innovation go hand-in-hand
with uncertainty and risk. In any one sitation, the
appeal of populism is as strong as the disaffection
towards the political system. The risks of authoritarian
regression are as real as the perspectives for
strengthening democracy through citizen participation
and civic culture. Much will depend on the capacity of
democratic leaders and empowered citizens to
interact in a constructive way, as they have done in
Brazil, to create the most successful developing
country programme to fight HIV and AIDS (de Oliveira
2001) or in the Colombian cities of Bogotá and
Medellín to fight violence with the resources of citizen
conviviality (Mockus 2002). The paramount
contributions of Latin America to global civil society
and to the global spread of democracy are to preserve
the freedom and autonomy of civil society and to
deepen democracy at the national and regional level.
The arguments presented in this chapter are an
invitation to the debate and a reaffirmation of the
value of democracy, understood as the exercise by
citizens of their capacity to deal with the questions
and influence the decisions that affect their lives, and
the future of society.
4 In his political memoirs Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2006) says
that if there is one lesson he learnt in his eight years as
president of Brazil, it is that, in today’s world, political leadership
is never gained once and for all. ‘Votes in an election, even
dozens of millions of them, are not enough. The day after, one
has to start almost from scratch’. Trust and legitimacy must be
constantly nurtured and renewed. It is no longer possible for the
leader to impose without negotiating, to decide without listening,
to govern without explaining and persuading.
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